The Blurring of the Line and its Consequences

In the summer of 2008, the Spanish parliament granted legal rights to apes, criminalizing their use in circuses or television commercials. The director of the “Great Apes Project” claims that “we are seeking to break the species barrier — we are just the point of the spear.” Such a claim is more than mildly disturbing. But equally disturbing, if not more so, are the many stories of the involuntary euthanasia of human beings who are simply sick or old. What has happened to our world? Apes are given rights, the “species barrier” is eroded, and humans are murdered in ever increasing numbers. Where will this end?

Perhaps a better question is, where did this begin? Peter Singer can take much of the credit – or, rather, the blame – for blurring the line between humans and animals. Singer claims that the difference between humans and animals is a “difference of degree” – that is, humans are only different from animals in their degree of intelligence, ability to communicate, etc., but that difference does not matter. What matters is that both humans and animals are capable of experiencing emotion, especially pain. Singer agrees with early “animal rights” activist Jeremy Bentham that “the question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” According to this reasoning, it is perfectly fine to kill an unborn child before he can experience pain (or, at least, before we know that he can), and it is fine to kill an elderly patient by euthanasia (painlessly, of course), but animals, such as apes, who can feel pain simply must be granted rights.

But does this make sense? Is this really a coherent way of viewing the differences between humans and animals? I think not. There are essential differences between humans and animals that Singer fails to consider. Animals act on instinct, but humans act with knowledge and choice, since humans have intellect and will. Humans are capable of understanding universal concepts, such as justice and charity, but animals are not. Indeed, as Chesterton said in The Everlasting Man, “it is the simple truth that man does differ from the brutes in kind and not in degree; and the proof of it is here; that it sounds like a truism to say that the most primitive man drew a picture of a monkey and that it sounds like a joke to say that the most intelligent monkey drew a picture of a man.” There are certain things that animals simply cannot do. They cannot fill libraries with books about humans, they cannot assemble to contemplate the course of the world, they cannot build brick houses. In short, animals are unable to do these things because they lack intellect and will. Thus they cannot be responsible for their actions and are not moral agents. This difference is something that is more than a difference of degree. Humans are drastically different in kind from animals.

Because animals are not moral agents, they do not have rights. They cannot have rights. Only persons can have rights, because only persons are moral agents. No matter how much we want our beloved Lassie to have rights, it is impossible. We must treat animals with respect, but that is a duty that is based on our nature, not theirs.

This, however, is not understood by much of society today. The Spanish are not the only ones claiming that we must eliminate the “species barrier.” Ingrid Newkirk, the founder of PETA, asserts that “when it comes to pain, love, joy, loneliness, and fear, a rat is a pig is a dog is a boy. Each one values his or her life and fights the knife.” A dog is a boy? Oh really? They may both be able to experience emotion, but I have yet to see a dog read and understand Tolkien’s trilogy. Speciesism, the term Singer uses to describe giving preferential treatment based on species, is becoming widely rejected today. Once people claim that the ability to experience “pain, love, joy, loneliness, and fear” is what gives a creature rights, it follows that people, human beings, do not have rights when they cannot experience those emotions. This leads to the greatest denial of inalienable rights present in today’s society: abortion. One argument people attempt to make supporting abortion is that the fetus is not fully human because he does not yet demonstrate the elusive and ever changing characteristics that would make him human, including showing emotion. Singer also claims that a being’s capability to have a sense of its own existence over time gives it greater consideration: “killing a newborn baby is never equivalent to killing a person, that is, a being who wants to go on living.” He goes on to say that it is often terrible to kill the baby, but that is only because most infants are wanted. This is a natural conclusion when the difference between humans and animals is seen as a difference of degree and not a difference of kind. A baby is valued only because he may be wanted by someone, not because he is a baby who has an inalienable right to life; yet Spain attempts to grant apes legal rights, rights which they are logically incapable of possessing. What next? To even begin to fix this situation, we must agree with Chesterton that humans differ from animals in kind, and not in degree.

Posted at 11:15 pm EST on the 22nd of October 2009 by M. T. Petra.

Under Philosophy as , ,

There are 2 replies.
 
  1. Nick says on October 23rd, 2009 at 4:23 am

    I think I follow you insofar as you argue that basing ethics on capability of suffering is pretty inadequate, though obviously your argument wouldn’t work on anyone who holds a view different from yours. I mean, you basically say in the end of your second paragraph that the theory is wrong because it allows abortion and euthanasia. I guess that’s a legitimate argument for this crowd, but it wouldn’t really work against someone who doesn’t believe abortion and euthanasia are wrong.

    But from your third paragraph on, I begin to disagree. You assert, “Animals act on instinct, but humans act with knowledge and choice, since humans have intellect and will.” How would you go about proving that animals act on instinct, whereas humans act with knowledge and choice? How would you prove that animals don’t have intellect and will? I don’t think it’s possible. You continue, saying, “Humans are capable of understanding universal concepts, such as justice and charity, but animals are not.” Well, certainly, some humans are capable of understanding some concepts. Children often are not; mentally handicapped people sometimes are not; occasionally full grown otherwise normal adults seem to be incapable as well.

    The quote from Chesterton proves nothing; examining the paintings at http://www.koko.org/world/art_still.html , two things seem obvious to me. 1. Our favorite Gorillas, Koko and Michael, are terrible at painting: I suspect they’re simply cognitively incapable of a great deal of realism. 2. The paintings do, however, on some level resemble, in color and in form, the objects. There is a huge difference between the most realistic painting of these Gorillas and the worst painting of a three year old — the three year old’s painting will be almost invariably better. However, it seems to me that the difference between the Gorillas and People, in the painting arena, really is a difference of degree. (The interviews on the site are also rather interesting and charming. Clearly the communication is limited and sometimes completely opaque; clearly there is also, at times, real communication going on.)

    After listing a bunch of things that animals can’t do, you assert that, “In short, animals are unable to do these things because they lack intellect and will.” I don’t see how that follows. Merely because an animal ostensibly can’t build brick houses, fill libraries, or contemplate the world doesn’t actually prove that they don’t have an intellect and will.

    Your fourth paragraph then makes another odd assertion. “Because animals are not moral agents, they do not have rights.” Clearly you are drawing on some philosophy that I’m not familiar with. Do beings only have rights insofar as they are moral agents? Explain.

    Your last paragraph is basically a recap, and again, I agree with you insofar as you’re against abortion, and but I’m very uncomfortable with your conclusion: “To even begin to fix this situation, we must agree with Chesterton that humans differ from animals in kind, and not in degree.”

  2. Carl Schilmer says on October 24th, 2009 at 11:05 am

    I have to say, I’m torn between agreeing with both of you on certain points. First, about the word intellectual. Nick was, I think, using it in a different sense than I will, so I’d like to clear this up.

    My quick definition of intellect: Humans have the ability to be ‘intellectual’, which, for the purposes of this discussion, I’m going to define as the ability to act out of thinking, knowing, or reasoning as opposed to acting of emotion or instinct. Thus, it is a function of a rational mind tied to a will.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that humans don’t act out of instinct. Just that they don’t have to.

    So, what of the other animals? You both seem agreed that humans are not like the other animals, though you seem differ as to the sort of difference.

    So, I pose the questions…

    Nick: You say that we do not know that animals don’t have minds. Fair enough. My old dog showed tons of personality, recognition, and even guilt. What do you make of man’s ability to pray? Is this an act of only a certain type of intellect (by your definition) or will, or only for the ‘intellectual’ (my definition)?

    MT: What specific grounds do you have for saying that animals do not have intellect, or will? My dog once ate out of his bag of food in the garage, when he wasn’t supposed to. For the rest of the day (until we found out), he was moping around, looking guiltily, and slinking off whenever we came near him.